The notion of group rights has recently received much attention in the theoretical literature on multiculturalism, and for good reasons, because it is indeed the most complex and controversial issue of what is grouped under the rubric of identity politics. The very concept of group-right is very questionable for liberal and democratic theory, first of all, because it is not clear what the notion of group-right precisely means. 
For some, group-rights represent legal entitlement for collectives (ethnic communities, cultural and religious groups) to act freely (without state-intervention) in certain areas, and to command certain resources. In this respect, the concept of group-rights seems to imply a collective agent whose will overimposes on members of the group, but a notion of collective agent emerging beyond its individual components is intrinsically contestable and bears problematic normative implications. In fact, members of groups which are granted collective rights, under this interpretation, are not simply citizens who are granted better chances to practice their creed or culture, and whose identity is supported and protected by the state so as to counter previous discrimination and exclusion. Members of minorities enjoying collective rights apparently find themselves in a double legal status: citizens of the state, and also bound to the rules of the groups, be it traditional practices or collective decisions. And membership in such groups is not voluntary, though, as a rule, the democratic state imposes the right to exit as a condition for group-rights to be granted. Still exit may be a very demanding condition for the individual in the group, who may want to be part of his/her native culture or religious communities, but without complying all customary rules. Thus, while voluntary associations can define their own rules, and make compliance a condition for membership - on the ground that voluntary association are freely joined and for limited purposes -  the case is different for traditional communities and cultural minorities, where membership is ascriptive and whose scope is a whole form of life. The protection of a minority as a collective may easily clash with the protection of individuals within the minority.
In order to overcome these difficulties, some have maintained that group-rights are actually completely reducible to individuals. Under this reading, group-rights are individual rights which can be enjoied only on the background of a communal practice. So, for example, the right to one's language is a right of the many individuals composing a linguistic group which can be practiced only within one's group. Without the collective background this kind of rights would make no sense, but their holders are just individuals who freely choose whether to enjoy their rights or not.
However, this reduction of group-rights to individual rights to be practiced only in groups does not seem to capture what is usually meant by the right to self-determination of a people whose rules are generally binding for its members. For this reason, other scholars have proposed that group-rights are justified in terms of individual rights but in many cases cannot be practiced just as individual rights on the background of a shared practice. An influential view on group-rights holds that they are to be seen as collective entitlements against the larger society instead of empowerment of the group over its members; and this defines the rationale of group-claims and the extent of their acceptability.
Beside the discussion over their meaning, justifyability and limits, group-rights raise a number of pragmatical difficulties, such as the definition of membership in the group, the extent of the group's autonomy, and the territorial boundaries of autonomy; last, but not least, the impending risk of political secession. All these difficulties notwithstanding, the recent discussion has pointed out that there may be good reasons for granting group-rights, from justice and from autonomy, that is from fundamental liberal democratic principles. I intend to take up this controversial issue, asking first whether there are any group-rights at all, and whether there is any need of them. I will then assess the various normative arguments in favor and against group-rights, and I will finally consider the circumstances under which the notion of collective rights can be acceptable within the liberal democratic framework. My aim is to draw a clear distinction between group-rights, on the one hand, and special provisions, preferential treatments, public support to cultures, on the other. Multicultural politics is basically made up by the latter, while the recourse to group-rights represent an unnecessary complication. The problem is then a clear specification of what kind of groups under what conditions can plausibly claim group-rights to the larger political society.