The main purpose of this paper is to apply the general idea of contextualism as a theory of knowledge attribution on the case of testimony and trust characterized by attribution of knowledge and sincerity to informator. More precisely, I have tried to exercise 'collapsing the levels', the reduction of the most usual debate about the contextualism to the level characteristic for the case of testimony. In the first part, I have given a brief account of evidentialism concerning trust. In the second part, I have considered the question how strong has to be an evidential basis for an epistemically responsible trust. In the final part, I will propose the trust-contextualism as the viewpoint that optimally harmonizes both our intuitive and theoretical requirements about epistemically responsible trust.

1. Evidentialism. Evidentialism concerning trust is the position which holds that epistemically responsible acceptance of any testimony is a matter of evidence (J. Adler, 2002). I have argue in favor of two thesis concerning evidentialist position about trust: (i) both reductivists and non-reductivists support the stance that justified trust is a matter of evidence about the informator's trustworthiness and her testimony that p; (ii) non-purism - in spite of fact the highest (Cartesian) evidential standard required by purists cannot be ever reached in the case of testimony, epistemically responsible can be trusting based on less demanded evidential standards.

There are two crucial questions for evidentialism:
1) What kind of evidence about informants can make a trust epistemically responsible?
2) How strong evidential basis insures epistemically responsible trust? I will concentrate in this paper only to the second.

2. Non-unitary character of trust. In traditional discussion, while T. Reid (non-reductivist) principally suggested a kind of blind trust without additional evidence, D. Hume (reductivist) principally required highly possibly demanded evidential basis. In the contemporary discussions, however, there is tendency to moderate these starting viewpoints (C.A.J. Coady, 1992; T. Burge's, 1993; E. Fricker1994, 1995; P. J. Graham, 2000. etc.). A certain consensus or 'new deal' is attained concerning two following theses: (i) Non-unitary character of evidential demands - in some situations we are epistemically responsible critically assessing our informants and searching for additional evidence and in some others we are equally epistemically responsible not to do so; (ii) Disaggregation thesis - a distinction between the epistemic demands for everyday situation on the one side and for non-everyday, situations on the other are made. Consequently, a need for a theoretical reconciliation of traditionally positions is imposed. I will try to offer an application of contextualism as a theory of knowledge attribution on the case of epistemically responsible trust (A. Goldman, 1976, D. Lewis, 1996; S. Cohen, 1990, 1998, 1999; K. De Rose,1999; M. Williams, 2001, etc.).

3. Trust contextualism.

3.1. Neutral position: In contrast both to Humean negative bias position and Reidian positive bias position, we assume the neutral position regarding trust. In null settings one should accept testimony just in case one has adequate evidence that it is true, that is, adequate evidence about informant's sincerity and competence.

3.2. Conversational context: Our accepted beliefs or background beliefs supply us with evidence to recognize and identify the conversational context - whether in this very specific situation there are reasons for doubt or whether the error-possibility is present. The conversational context in which a testimony is made, determines hearer's epistemic position or evidential standard that she has to apply.

3.3. Context-sensible evidential standards: For each conversational context of testimony, there is standard for how strong hearer's evidence has to be in order to justify the hearer trusting in p. The evidential standards that used to be applied in one conversational context are found to be inappropriate in others.

3.4. Error-possibilities. What make conversational contexts different are actually different levels of error-possibilities. That means that evidential standards are raised and lowered by what error possibilities have been brought up by conversational context.

3.5. Disaggregation requirement refined: Distinction between ordinary and non-ordinary contexts is extremely simplified. More probably, we deal with the fine grained scale of conversational contexts and corresponded evidential standards. Finally, I have proposed an ascription principle adapted to trust contextualism: (AP) H is epistemically responsible in ascription of knowledge and sincerity concerning testimony p to I, iff H has evidence that eliminates contextually relevant error-possibility concerning knowledge and sincerity of I's reporting that p.