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Brains, Persons, and Society *** ABSTRACTS
Cervelli, Persone e Società ***ABSTRACTS |
Miguel-Ángel
Capó-Navarro
University of the
Balearic Islands
Ethics and
psychopathy
In this piece of
work I will analyze
how the empirical knowledge of a syndrome, namely psychopathy, can be
used
within the ethical debate. These late years has grown a tendency to pay
attention to new empirical knowledge, mainly from psychology, by
philosophers
trying to clarify longstanding ethical disputes (see Doris et al.,
2005, 2006,
Doris et al., in press; Nichols,
2002a, 2002b).
The
case of psychopathy is being
held as relevant in at least three different but connected debates.
Firstly,
rationalist theories of ethics vs. sentimentalists theories, secondly,
moral internalism
vs. moral externalism and thirdly, psychopathic criminals could pose a
problem
for a retributivistic theory of punishment.
Psychopathic
individuals are
characterized by their amoral behaviour (Hare, 1993). That makes them
perfect
candidates for testing the plausibility of moral theories. Proponents
of
sentimentalist theories as Nichols (2002a; 2002b,2004) think that their
amorality springs from some emotional deficits. As the psychopaths are
unable
to experience guilt or remorse, they have difficulties to feel empathy,
despite
not having impaired rational capacities (Blair, 1995). If this is
accepted,
sentimentalist theories would gain empirical support in front of
rationalist
theories. Rationalists as Maibom (2003) defend their position arguing
that
psychopaths have their capacity of practical
reason damaged, but leaving unclear how this practical reason
encompasses
emotional aspects.
The
second related debate face internalism and
externalism about morality. Externalists hold that it is possible for
someone
who is disposed sincerely to express some moral judgment simply not to
care
about the subject of that judgment, while internalists deny this, as
they think
that there is an essential link between thinking something good or
right and
caring about it in some way. A notorious difficulty for internalism is
suggested by Hume’s (1777/1966, pp.282 ff) “sensible knave,” a person
who
recognizes that the unjust and dishonest acts he contemplates are
wrong, but is
completely unmoved by this realization. More recent writers (e. g.,
Nichols
2002) have suggested that the sensible knave (or “the amoralist”, in
philosophical jargon) is more than a philosophical fiction, as
psychopaths
appear to know the difference between
right and wrong but quite generally lack motivation to do what
is right.
These empirical findings could make internalism a weakened position
(Doris
& Stich, 2005).
But
there is an alternative for internalists. Blair
(1995) found in his study of psychopaths that “while the
non-psychopaths made the moral/conventional distinction, the
psychopaths did not”. The moral/conventional distinction is an well
known topic
in the developmental psychology literature (i.e. see Nucci, 2001),
although not
free of some critics (Sripada et
al., in press). The internalist
could defend that if the psychopaths are not able to distinguish moral
rules
from conventional rules, they are not able to engage in a true
moral judgment. That would release internalism from the
empirical burden and also leave open the characterization of a true
moral
judgment.
Finally,
the way that we
characterize psychopathy could have a role in the debate between the
retributivist and consequentialist justifications of punishment (see
Greene
& Cohen, 2004). Psychopathy is not considered extenuating in case
of
offence, as it is commonly considered that psychopaths retain all their
rational
capacities. Retributivism depends on a full mental
capacity, and the acceptance of free will. If it was demonstrated that
psychopaths lack some capacity to make proper moral judgments, a
punishment
based in retributivistic reasons would have weak foundations, as
opposed to a
consequentialist justification of punishment.
Some
of the relevant references to the topic discussed are:
Blair, R.J.
(1995) “A cognitive developmental approach to morality:
investigating the
psychopath”, Cognition, 57, pp. 1-29
Doris, J.
& Stich, S.(2005) “As a matter of fact: Empirical perspectives on
ethics”.
In F. Jackson & M. Smith The Oxford Handbook of
Contemporary Philosophy, OUP
Doris, J.
& Stich, S.(2006) "Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2006 Edition), E.
Zalta (ed.),
forthcoming URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/moral-psych-emp/>.
Doris, J &
Platkias, A (en
prensa) “How to argue about disagreement: evaluative diversity and
moral
realism”. En Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) The
biology and philosophy of morality, OUP
Dwyer, S (1999)
“Moral development
and moral responsibility”. En K Murasugi &
R. Stainton (eds.) Philosophy and
Linguistics,
Westview Press,
Dwyer, S (2003)
“Moral development
and moral responsibility”, The Monist,
86, 181-199
Greene, J. &
Cohen, J. (2004) “For the law
neuroscience changes nothing and everything” Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 359, 1775–1785
Hare, R (1993) Without conscience, the disturbing world of the psychopaths
among us,
Atria
Hume, D
(1777/1966). Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals. New
York:
Open
Court (1966).
Lenman, J (2003)
“Moral deviants and
amoral saints: a dilemma for moral externalism”, The
Southern Journal of Philosophy, XLI, 223-240
Maibom, H (2003)
“Moral unreason:
the case of psychopathy”, Mind &
Language, 20, 2, pp. 237-257
Nichols, S
(2002a) “How psychopaths
threaten moral rationalism, or is it irrational to be amoral?”, The Monist, 85, 285-303
Nichols, S
(2002b) “Norms with
feeling: towards a psychological account of moral judgment”, Cognition, 84, 221-36
Nichols, S
(2004a) “After
objectivity”, Philosophical Psychology,
17
Nichols, S
(2004b) Sentimental rules, Oxford University
Press
Nucci, LP.
(2001). Education in the Moral Domain.
Cambridge
University
Press
Sripada, C &
Stich, S (in press) “A framework for the psychology of
norms”. To appear in
P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich, eds., Innateness and the
Structure of the Mind, Vol. II