Brains, Persons, and Society *** ABSTRACTS
   Cervelli, Persone e Società ***ABSTRACTS





E. J. Lowe

The Metaphysics of Human Persons

 There are compelling metaphysical reasons for denying that human persons are identical with their organized bodies or with any part of those bodies, such as their brains. But these reasons only establish the non-identity of self and body, not their separability, nor the immateriality of the human self. This leaves us with something of a mystery: how, exactly, is a person related to his or her body, if not by identity? One possible view, which has received some support lately, is that persons are constituted by their bodies, or at least by certain parts of their bodies. But the notion of constitution is not an entirely clear one and, in any case, there are other difficulties with this view. It may be, in the light of these difficulties, that we have to regard the relation of embodiment as a sui generis one, however repugnant this idea may be to philosophers and scientists with strong naturalistic or physicalistic commitments.