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Brains, Persons, and Society *** ABSTRACTS
Cervelli, Persone e Società ***ABSTRACTS |
E.
J. Lowe
The Metaphysics
of Human Persons
There
are
compelling metaphysical reasons for denying that human persons are
identical
with their organized bodies or with any part of those bodies, such as
their
brains. But these reasons only establish the non-identity of self and
body, not
their separability, nor the immateriality of the human self. This
leaves us
with something of a mystery: how, exactly, is
a person related to his or her body, if not by identity? One possible
view,
which has received some support lately, is that persons are constituted
by their bodies, or at least
by certain parts of their bodies. But the notion of constitution is not
an
entirely clear one and, in any case, there are other difficulties with
this
view. It may be, in the light of these difficulties, that we have to
regard the
relation of embodiment as a sui generis
one, however repugnant this idea may be to philosophers and scientists
with
strong naturalistic or physicalistic commitments.